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Abstract: Over the business cycle, labor’s share of output is negatively but weakly correlated with 
output, and it lags output by about four quarters. Profit’s share is strongly procyclical. It neither leads 
nor lags output, and its volatility is about four times that of output. Despite the importance of 
understanding the dynamics of income shares for understanding aggregate technology and the degree 
of competition in factor markets, macroeconomics lacks models that can account for these dynamics. 
This paper constructs a model that can replicate those facts. We introduce costly entry of firms in a 
model with frictional labor markets and find a link between the ability of the model to replicate 
income shares’ dynamics and the ability of the model to amplify and propagate shocks. That link is a 
countercyclical real interest rate, a well-known fact in U.S. data but a feature that models of aggregate 
fluctuations have had difficulty achieving. 
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Most research in aggregate ﬂuctuations has assumed factor income shares to be con-
stant at all frequencies due to particular assumptions about technology and about the
degree of competition in markets for goods and factors of production. The assumption
of constant shares does not pass a test of casually inspecting the data, let alone ana-
lyzing it with sophisticated statistical tools. Understanding the time series behavior of
income shares is critical for understanding the structure of aggregate technology and
the behavior of factor markets. Despite the importance of income shares’ behavior,
macroeconomics lacks models that can quantitatively match the time series facts of in-
come shares. This paper makes two contributions. First, it shows that existing models
with time-varying income shares cannot account for their dynamics. Second, it con-
structs a model which can replicate, if not for all, many of the properties that describe
the behavior of income shares.
During the post-war period, labor’s share correlation with output is negative but
weak; it lags output by about four quarters and is smoother than output. On the other
hand, the proﬁts’ share is strongly pro-cyclical; it neither leads nor lags output; and its
volatility is about four times that of output. As labor is arguably the most important
factor of production, coupled with the fact that perfect competition in labor markets
implies a tight link between wages and output, these facts have prompted previous
studies to deviate from a Walrasian labor market. They have done so by specifying
contractual arrangements between employers andemployeesthat have broken the link
between wages and the marginal product of labor. The goal was to match properties of
labor’s share over the business cycle. Examplesofthis line of work include Boldrin and
Horvath (1995), Gomme and Greenwood (1995), and Danthine and Donaldson (1992).
Dispensing with a Walrasian framework is a characteristic of literature that features
searchandmatchingfrictionsinlabormarkets, e.g. Pissarides(1985). Ourresearch falls
1within thisframework.1 Although thisliterature hasclaimed successin matchingsome
labor market business cycle moments, we show that the dynamics of income shares are
completely at odds with the data. We link this failure to the typical assumption of free
entryofﬁrms, which leadstothe assetvalueof avacantposition tobe exactlyzero atall
frequencies. That free entry implies that the value of a vacant position equals zero can
be seen easily from the textbook model of search and matching, for example Pissarides
(2000). This model features ﬁrms posting vacancies to get matched to workers who are
searching for jobs. If entry is free and any ﬁrm that wishes to do so can pay a vacancy-
posting cost and wait for this position to get ﬁlled, the present value of such a vacancy
mustbe zeroin equilibrium. Ifit werepositive, ﬁrms would continue topost vacancies,
lowering the probability that a given vacancy gets ﬁlled until its present value reaches
zero.
We construct an environment in which the present value of a vacant position is
always positive and endogenously varies over the business cycle. A vacancy has posi-
tive asset value because ﬁrms need to incur entry costs before they are allowed to post
a vacancy, hire workers, and begin production. The equilibrium value of a vacancy
is equal to the sunk cost, so that ﬁrms are indifferent between entering or staying out
of the market. This equilibrium asset value is also time-varying. The reason: entrants
rent factors of production to pay for the sunk cost and the efﬁciency of these factors
is affected by the same shocks that generate aggregate ﬂuctuations. As the prices and
quantities of these factors vary with aggregate conditions, so do the expenditures that
entrants undertake. In equilibrium, these expenditures must equal the capital value of
a vacancy.
To some extent, our economy resembles a two-sector environment. The ﬁrst sector
produces goods and services that households consume, and the second sector pro-
duces services that entrants need to purchase. These purchases, in turn, allow entrants
1An alternative approach to study time-varying income shares is to introduce that time variation
exogenously. This exogeneitystill allows the researcherto analyzejoint dynamicsof those income shares
with endogenous variables; output, for example. This is done by Young (2004).
2to access the goods-producing sector and proﬁt from the sales of those goods. How-
ever, those two sectors compete for the same factors of production causing the dynam-
ics of entrants to inﬂuence the dynamics of the demand, and hence prices, of those
factors. Based on speciﬁc modeling assumptions described later in this paper, the be-
havior of these prices determines the dynamics of the value of a vacancy. We show
that a reasonable parameterization of our environment can match the joint dynamics
of labor’s share, proﬁts’ share, and output. The model is consistent with the lagging
behavior of labor’s share, its weak correlation with output, and the hump-shaped re-
sponse of labor’s share to a shock to productivity. The model is also consistent with
the strong correlation of output with proﬁts’ share and its lack of leading or lagging be-
havior. Matching the dynamics of income shares would be a Pyrrhic victory if it came
at the expense of matching other business cycle moments. We show that this scenario
is not the case. On the contrary, the very mechanism that improves the dynamics of
income shares helps to amplify and propagate productivity shocks to the labor mar-
ket, and the dynamics of investment and consumption are similar to existing models.
Of course, our model works less well in some dimensions, and we report and discuss
those factors as well. For instance, it is difﬁcult to match the magnitude of empirical
impulse response of labor’s share to a productivity shock and, at the same time, match
the low volatility of labor’s share (relative to output).
We show that these results depend on one equilibrium outcome: that the value of
a vacancy is countercyclical. In fact, parameterizations of our economy that yield a
pro-cyclical capital value of a vacancy are inconsistent with the dynamics of income
shares, and they feature virtually no ampliﬁcation of shocks. Unfortunately, no good
empirical data exist as counterparts to the asset value of a vacancy. Fortunately, in our
model, the dynamics of the real interest rate essentially determine the dynamics of the
value of a vacancy. However imperfect, we do have measures of real interest rates, and
we show that the real interest rate is indeed countercyclical. The negative correlation
between the real rate and output, and the fact that most models of economic ﬂuctu-
3ations cannot replicate it, has been reported by King and Rebelo (1999). We provide
alternative measures of the real rate and conﬁrm previous ﬁndings. We emphasize
that despite this counter-cyclicality of real rates, the dynamics of aggregate investment
are almost identical to those of existing models.
2 The Model Economy
2.1 Environment
Our economy is populated by a large extended household comprised of a continuum
of members of total mass equal to ¯ N and an inﬁnite mass of ﬁrms.
Members in the household can either be employed or unemployed. Unemployed
agents receive an unemployment beneﬁt while they search for jobs with the hope of
ﬁnding a job opportunity. This opportunity will allow them to enter into a relationship
with a ﬁrm, to negotiate a contract that stipulates the retribution for their services,
and to produce output during the following period. A fraction Nt of employed agents
works and gets paid the negotiated wage. Members of the household have preferences
over a sequence of a composite of goods over time, {Ct} ∞
t=0. The per-period utility
function is of the relative risk aversion class. The household’s (expected) discounted












where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and σ > 0 is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aver-
sion. We assume that each ﬁrm produces a differentiated commodity. At each point
in time, there is a subset of goods Xt ⊆ X available to consumers, and the composite
good is made up of commodities from that subset. The available set is time-varying as
not all ﬁrms will produce every period. To aggregate over different commodities, we










where γ > 1isthesymmetricelasticityofsubstitution betweencommodities. If pt(x) is
the price2 of product x, then the level of ct(x) chosen to minimize the cost of acquiring
















Each ﬁrm uses capital and one unit of labor to produce its commodity. The job
market in our economy is characterized by the existence of search and matching fric-
tions (see Rogerson et al. (2005) for a survey of this literature). To hire a worker, a
ﬁrm must post a vacancy and undertake a recruiting expense of ω per vacancy posted.
Firms and potential workers match in a labor market, according to a constant-returns-
to-scale matching technology M( ¯ N − N,V) given by:
M( ¯ N − N,V) =
( ¯ N − N)V




2As the subset of goods changes over time, it is more convenient to express this price in terms of
“money” than to use any of the consumption goods as the numeraire. This is done for convenience
only, and this “money” acts as a unit of account and is not valued for facilitating trades or for any other
quality.
3P can be obtained by solving the consumer expenditure minimization problem for constructing one















5This matching function takes as inputs the total number of unemployed individuals
who are searching, ¯ N − N, and the total number of vacancies posted by ﬁrms, V. The
output is a number of matches M. Denoting by θ the vacancies to unemployment ratio
V






















A match between a ﬁrm and a worker results in a wage contract that speciﬁes a wage
wt(x), paid in exchange of labor services. We assume that ﬁrms and workers split the
surplus from their relationship according to a Nash bargaining rule. We will explore
this rule further after we have established the notation regarding workers’ and ﬁrms’
valuefunctions. Therelationship betweenaﬁrm andaworker canbreakeitherbecause
the ﬁrm exogenously ends production, which happens with probability τ, or for any
other reason, which happens at rate s.
Firms need to pay a sunk cost to begin the goods production process.5 Opening a
ﬁrm orstarting a newproduct variety needsyE effective unitsofcapital, i.e. yE = ZtKE
t .
We assume the productivity process Zt is ﬁrst-order Markov. Denoting by rt the rental
rate of capital and noting that one unit of capital produces Zt units of the composite
good, the sunk cost of entry is
rtyE
Zt or rtKE
t (in units of the composite consumption
good). We denote the number of entrants, the number of ﬁrms that pay the sunk cost,
by NE
t .
Let us now describe the technology for producing the differentiated commodity,
which, as the reader may recall, involves capital and labor. Denoting the ﬁrm’s output
4We depart from the more frequent Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for the matching function to bound
the job-ﬁnding and vacancy-ﬁlling probabilities to be between 0 and 1. This functional form was chosen
by Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
5Our approach for modeling ﬁrm entry follows Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2006).
6of the differentiated product x by yc




where Zt is the same random productivity process that determines the efﬁciency of
capital when paying for the sunk cost, and lt(x) is the amount of labor employed by
the ﬁrm, which is one if the ﬁrm produces and zero otherwise. The ﬁrm charges a price
equal to ρt(x), and its proﬁts are given by πt(x) = ρt(x)yc
t(x) − wt(x) − rtKC
t (x).
Finally, the government plays a very limited role in our economy. Its task is solely
to tax the household a lump-sum quantity and rebate it to the unemployed in the form
of a beneﬁt.
2.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
We restrict ourselves to a symmetric equilibrium, in which all goods-producing ﬁrms
charge equal prices, ρt(x) = ρt; demand one unit of labor, which gets paid the same
wage wt(x) = wt; and produce the same amount of output, yc
t(x) = yc
t. Given the
CES structure of the consumption aggregate, the relative price ρt that ﬁrms charge is
given by 6 N
1
γ−1
t , and the per-ﬁrm proﬁt is given by, πt = ρtyc
t −wt −rtKc
t. The relevant




minimize notation, we write down value functions without being speciﬁc about their
dependence on the state vector.
Households own a diversiﬁed portfolio of ﬁrms, and as a result, ﬁrms discount
expected future ﬂows taking into account the household’s inter-temporal condition.























t , as Nt is the both the fraction of ﬁrms producing as well as
the number of workers in the goods-producing sector by our assumption of one job per ﬁrm.







Let Qt denote the capital value of a vacancy and Jt denote the capital value of a ﬁlled
job. The following two recursive relationships must be satisﬁed:
Qt = −ω + (1 − τ) Et∆t+1[qtJt+1 + (1 − qt)Qt+1], (9)
Jt = πt + (1 − τ)Et∆t+1[(1 − s)Jt+1 + sQt+1]. (10)
Equation (9) states that the value of a vacancy (once the entry decision has been
made) is the difference between two objects. The ﬁrst object is the expected value of
entering the labor market and trying to match with a worker. This matching happens
with probability qt, as long as the ﬁrm survives for one period, which happens with
probability 1− τ. The second object is the vacancy cost ω.
The interpretation of equation (10) is analogous: the value of a ﬁlled job is the proﬁt
ﬂow π plus the expected continuation value of the relationship between the ﬁrm and
the worker. Conditional on the ﬁrm’s survival, the relationship ends with probability
s and continues with probability 1 − s.




Due to entry costs, vacant jobs have positive value in equilibrium, which in turn leads
ﬁrms to repost vacancies following separations. The following two equations give the
laws of motion for the stock of employment and vacancies:
Nt+1 = (1− τ)[(1 − s)Nt + ft( ¯ N − Nt)], (12)
Vt+1 = (1− τ)[(1 − qt)Vt + sNt] + NE
t . (13)
8Employment at time t + 1 is the sum of matches (1 − s)Nt that were not destroyed
either by the death of a ﬁrm or any other form of separation, and the newly-formed
matches ft( ¯ N − Nt) from a previous pool of unemployed people. The total number
of vacancies in the economy, given by equation (13), is equal to vacancies that did not
get ﬁlled in the current period, (1 − qt)Vt plus the number of separated matches sNt.
Of course, we need to include the fraction of ﬁrms which continue operating for at
least one more period. Finally, we need to add to reach the total, the number of newly
created ﬁrms NE
t , each of which posts a vacancy. Both employment and vacancies are
predetermined variables.
The household’s problem is relatively straightforward. Given its current period re-
sources, it chooses consumption and investment to maximize the expected discounted
value of lifetime utility. In addition to wage income and unemployment beneﬁts,
the household gets interest from renting capital as well as a pay-out from its diver-
siﬁed ownership stake in ﬁrms. The aggregate dividends ﬁrms pay out equal to dt =
Ntπt −ωVt −QtNE
t . Finally, the household pays a lump-sum tax Tt, which the govern-
ment uses to ﬁnance its unemployment beneﬁts program. Denoting by Wt the house-








Ct + It = b( ¯ N − Nt) + wtNt + rtKt + dt − Tt, (15)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (16)






(rt+1 + 1− δ)
#
= 1. (17)
9As discussed in the previous section, wages for employed workers are the result
of Nash bargaining between each worker/ﬁrm pair. The surplus of the match for the
household is captured by the change in welfare derived from having a marginal un-
employed person who is then hired. This change is given by ∂Wt
∂Nt, which in units of the
consumption good is ∂Wt
∂NtCσ
t . The surplus for the ﬁrm is given by Jt − Qt, the differ-
ence between the value of a ﬁlled job and the value of a vacancy. The Nash bargaining











which yields the following equation for wages:
wt = (1− φ)b + φ(ρtZt − rtKC
t + ω) − φ(1− θt)(ω + Qt − (1− τ)Etβ∆t+1Qt+1). (19)
To better understand the analysis on the dynamics of income shares that follows,
let us ﬁrst deﬁne these shares. Total output yt can be decomposed in three elements:
payments to capital, labor, and equity-holders. As a result we can re-write output as,
yt = rtKt + Ntwt + Ntπt.7
Labor’s share is then deﬁned as wtNt
yt , and proﬁts’ share is deﬁned as Ntπt
yt .
We can now describe a symmetric equilibrium for our economy. It is a sequence of
prices ρt,wt,rt ; a sequence of aggregate quantities Kt,Ct, Nt,Vt, NE
t ,πt; and a sequence
of value functions Qt, Jt,Wt such that for any time period t, the following conditions
hold:
1. (HouseholdOptimization) Given prices ρ,w,r, the household’s optimization results
in decision rules for Ct and It and the value function Wt.
7To be clear about how we reach this expression, recall that proﬁts are deﬁned by πt = ρtyc
t − rtKc
t −




substitution yields yt = rtKE
t NE
t + Nt(πt + rtKC
t + wt) = rtKt + Ntπt + Ntwt.
102. (Factor Market Clearing) The interest rate rt equates the capital demanded by new
entrants NE
t and current producers Nt to that supplied by the household , and
the wage w satisﬁes the Nash bargaining solution given by equation (19).
3. (Goods Market Clearing) Ct + It + ωVt = ρtyc
tNt.
4. (Firm’s Optimization) Given the demand for a differentiated commodity given by
equation (3), ρt is the proﬁt-maximizing price for the monopolist. Aggregate la-
bor demand and vacancies posted by all ﬁrms, NE
t , Nt and Vt, satisfy equations
(12) and (13), and the vacancy and ﬁlled position values satisfy equations (9) and
(10).
5. (Entry Condition) Qt = rtKE
t .
6. (Government) The government satisﬁes its budget constraint: b( ¯ N − Nt) = T.
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the monthly frequency by assigning values to parameters,
so that steady-state moments in the model match those observed in U.S. data. The
risk aversion coefﬁcient σ is set to 1.5, well within the range of values typically used
in studies of aggregate ﬂuctuations. The discount factor β is set to 0.99
1
3, implying a
steady-state interest rate equal to 4.1% per annum.
We assume that the productivity process Zt follows an AR(1) process with persis-
tence parameter ρz and a zero-mean normally distributed shock with variance σ2
ǫ. We
set ρz = 0.964 and σǫ = 0.0052, which are consistent with the cyclical persistence
and variance in the observed Solow residual.8 Lacking direct evidence on a reason-
able value for the workers’ bargaining parameter φ, we set it equal to 0.5 to make our
results comparable to the existing literature (e.g. Shimer (2005)).
8In the presence of monopolistic competition, variations in the Solow residual cannot be directly as-
sociated with productivity of factors of production. The computation of the Solow residual assumes
perfect competition and only then can that association be made. For an extensive discussion, see Horn-
stein (1993).
11We calibrate the exit probability τ and the separation rate s following a procedure
similar to that of Den Haan et al. (2000). Let Σ be the total job separation rate caused
either by a ﬁrm’s death or any other cause. The rate at which ﬁrms exit the market
and do not repost vacancies is τ, while (1 − τ)s is the rate at which workers separate
from ﬁrms but where ﬁrms repost vacancies immediately. Hence, Σ = τ + (1 − τ)s.
The fraction of vacancies that are reposted immediately after separations is then
(1−τ)s
Σ .
Denote this quantity by Ω. Note also that ΣN gives the total ﬂow out of employment,
and as a result, ΩqΣN gives the total number of posted vacancies ﬁlled. If we subtract
the number of posted vacancies that are ﬁlled from the total ﬂow out of employment,
we get the steady-state mass of jobs that is destroyed permanently: ΣN − ΣNΩq =
ΣN(1 − Ωq). In a steady state, job destruction must equal job creation. The empirical
evidence described by Shimer (2005) sets Σ equal to 0.1 at the quarterly frequency,
which implies 1− (1 − 0.1)
1
3 = 0.035 at the monthly frequency. Therefore,
Σ = (1 − τ)s + τ = 0.035. (20)
Davis et al. (1996) report that the job-creation-to-employment ratio in the manufac-
turing sector is0.052quarterly, which impliesa valueof0.018atthe monthly frequency.







From equations (20) and (21) we can solve for s = 0.021 and τ = 0.014.
Consistent with estimates reported by Basu and Fernald (1997), we set γ = 11,
which implies a markup of 10 percent. Changing the total mass of workers ¯ N only
amounts to changing the levels, i.e., the scale of output and the mass of employment,
etc. But the unit-free ratios (e.g., unemployment rate, v-u ratio, and consumption-
output ratio etc.), are unaffected. Therefore, a choice of ¯ N does not affect any of
12the second moments and the impulse responses. We choose ¯ N > 1 so that the mo-





We are left with six parameters to calibrate: (b,yE,δ,ω,ξ,α). To do so, we choose
six additional moments that the model needs to match in its steady state. Based on
his own calculations, Shimer (2005) documents that the monthly job ﬁnding rate is
0.45. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) argue that vacancy postings have an average of 3
weeks, which implies that the vacancy ﬁlling rate is 1−(1−1/3)4 = 0.802 per month.
Note that the steady state value of market tightness can be written as θ =
f
q = 0.56.
We choose to match the aggregate capital to aggregate output ratio, and we set it to a
value of 36, which implies a value of 3 at the annual frequency. We set total recruiting
costs as a fraction of GDP, given by ωV/Y, to 0.015. A controversial choice is that of
the value of the unemployment beneﬁt b. Much of the literature argues that the value
of non-work activities is far below what workers actually produce on the job. How-
ever, calibrations such as Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2007) claim success in terms of
the cyclical properties of the model when the outside option for workers is very close
to their productivity. Under the interpretation of b as purely monetary unemployment
beneﬁts, we set b so that the steady-state replacement ratio b/w is 0.42, as in Shimer
(2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2006). Finally, we want to match an additional moment
in the steady-state value for labor’s share, which is 0.60 for the sample under consid-
eration. In conclusion, to assign values to the vector of parameters (b,yE,δ,ω,ξ,α), we
choose the following six moments: f = 0.45, θ = 0.56, ωV/Y = 0.015, K/Y = 36,
b/w = 0.42, and wN/Y.
We summarize our parameterization in Table 2.1.
9As the steady-state value of NE is small, one needs a high value of yE to match the value for the
capital-to-output ratio found in the data.
13Table 2.1: Summary of Parameterization
Parameter Value Target/Source
σ 1.500 Prev. work






s 0.021 Σ = 0.035




δ 0.002 K/Y = 36
b 0.380 b/w = 0.42
yE 3,1409 wV/Y = 0.015
ω 0.516 f = 0.45
ξ 1.551 θ = 0.561
α 0.02 wN/Y = 0.60
3 Results
3.1 The Cyclical Behavior of Labor’s and Corporate Proﬁts Shares
Having assigned parameter values to the model, we solve it, simulate it, and judge its
implications against U.S. data. Our solution technique is standard: we approximate
the true solution by a ﬁrst order expansion around the model’s deterministic steady
state. Since the calibration is done at the monthly frequency, we transform the model’s
output by aggregating its “monthly” data into “quarterly” data by taking three-month
averages. We transform the model’s output and U.S. data in the same way: we de-
trend them by taking logs and applying a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.10
To construct the labor’s and proﬁt shares, we proceed as follows. To measure the
share of income that goes to labor, we add total private salaries and wages, supple-
ments to salaries and wages, and all of proprietors’ income. We divide this sum by
national income. To compute proﬁts’ shares, we take corporate proﬁts and divide them
by national income. Our sample starts in 1951 (1st quarter) and ends in 2003 (fourth
10The HP smoothing parameter we use is 1,600, a standard choice when using quarterly data.
14quarter).
Figure 1 showscorrelations betweenreal GDPandlabor’ssharewith different leads
and lags for the U.S. economy. Correlations are not strong, the maximum is about 0.40,
and the contemporaneous correlation is (signiﬁcantly) smaller than the correlation be-
tween output and the labor’s share with a four-period lead. Consequently, labor’s
share lags real GDP because its correlation coefﬁcient with output is highest after four
quarters. Labor’s share is countercyclical but very weakly so: the contemporaneous
correlation is -0.28, and the 5th percentile for the sample distribution of that correla-
tion is -0.15. Figure 2 shows a similar picture for the (corporate) proﬁts’ share which
shows stronger cyclical dynamics than the labor’s share. Also, it is procyclical, and
shows no leading or lagging pattern.

























Figure 1: Correlations between Real Gross Domestic Product and (led and lagged) Labor’s
Share of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003.
How well does the model of costly ﬁrm entry match these patterns compared to
standard models where ﬁrm entry is free? Let’s begin with labor’s share.11 Figure
11All results presented in the paper have CES preferences, see equation (2). This speciﬁcation features
constant markups. To introduce time-varying markups we changed the utility function to be of the
translog type, see Feenstra (2003). The results are similar to the baseline CES case and they are available
153 displays the empirical cross-correlations, the same values as Figure 1 represented
by the dotted and dash-dotted lines, along with the cross-correlations from the entry
model (labeled “Model” in the ﬁgure and represented by the circled-thick line). La-
bor’s share in the model matches the patterns observed in the data remarkably well.
The contemporaneous correlation is weak with a value of -0.15 and well within the
error bounds provided for the empirical correlations.




























of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003.
The correlations with one lead and one lag quantitatively match their empirical
counterparts, and only correlations at higher leads and lags are somewhat stronger
than those found in the data. Most importantly, the model gets the lagging pattern of
labor’s share right: after an increase in output, labor’s share shows the largest increase
four quarters later without a large contemporaneous effect. Figure 4 shows the analog
to Figure 3 for the proﬁts’ share rather than for labor’s share. The ﬁgure shows that the
model with costly entry matches well with the correlations at several leads and lags of
the proﬁts’ share and output. In fact, all correlations are within the error bounds con-
upon request.
16structed for the empirical point estimates. Before we explain the pattern of correlations
in the model with costly entry, let’s compare it to a benchmark model: the model with
free entry. Readers can think of this model as a version of the one solved in Shimer
(2005), to which we add capital. We model it in discrete time, and to improve its ﬁt
of labor market business cycle dynamics, we calibrate it along the lines of Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2009).12 Figure 5 adds to Figure 3 the patterns of correlations between
output and labor’s share computed from the model with free entry. The ﬁgure shows
how the labor’s share in the free entry model is strongly countercyclical. Although it
may not be apparent from a quick glance at the graph, the value of the contemporane-
ous correlation is -0.95, as opposed to -0.15 in the costly entry model and -0.20 in the
data. These differences are large. The performance of the free entry model regarding
the proﬁts share is better, as one can see in Figure 6, but considerably worse than the
costly entry model. In the free entry model, the strong cyclicality in the proﬁts share,
which is consistent with the data, comes at the expense of a strong cyclicality in the
labor’s share, which is not. De-linking the cyclical dynamics of the two shares, in the
sense of generating weak correlations between labor’s share and output and strong
correlations between the proﬁts’ share and output, is something our model is able to
achieve.
The strong countercyclicality of labor’s share generated in the free entry model is
caused by the relatively larger response of output to a rise in productivity. Matching
frictions prevents employment from adjusting immediately to a productivity shock, a
feature of all models presented in this paper. In the free entry model, both wages and
output respond rapidly to a change in productivity, but output responds relatively
stronger. As a result, labor’s share falls sharply (relative to its steady state value) but
as employment rises in subsequent periods, labor’s share rises as well. This movement
explains the strong negative contemporaneous correlation and the mildly positive cor-
relation of output with the value of labor’s share three or four quarters later.
12We describe with more detail the structure and calibration of the free-entry model in the Appendix.



























Figure 3: Correlations between Real Gross Domestic Product and (led and lagged) Labor’s
Share of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003 (dashed-dotted lines) and Costly Entry model (circled
line)








In other words, total output is the sum of income in two “sectors”: the commodity
producing sector, ρtyc
tNt, and the “start-up” sector, rtKE
t NE
t . The joint dynamics of both
sectors determine the dynamics of total output. In the case of a positive productivity
shock, an immediate response is a drop in KE, the “per-start-up” amount of capital,
as yE is constant. The number of entrants NE rises, as the present value of proﬁts is
now higher. The remaining key variable determining the behavior of output in the
“start-up” sector is therefore the interest rate, rt. The equilibrium interest rate is deter-




t, isa predetermined variable but the economy can reallocate itintra-
temporally between the two sectors. The technology of the goods producing sector be-
ing Cobb-Douglas forces interest rates to rise in the face of a positive technology shock.
This result is standard in models of economic ﬂuctuations with Cobb-Douglas technol-
18ogy and the culprit for the strong procyclicality of real interest rates in the real business
cycle literature. What happens in the “start-up” sector? Because KE
t falls when Zt rises,
the demand for capital by any given entrant is lower, forcing interest rates to drop. In
summary, the behavior of interest rates in the face of an increase in productivity is the
result of two counteracting forces. On the one hand, technology in the goods produc-
ing sector pulls interest rates upward when productivity rises, but on the other hand,
it lowers the amount of capital an entrant needs, lowering the demand for capital and
pulling rates downward. Using the calibration described previously, interest rates are
countercyclical. This drop in interest rates is responsible for the more muted response
of output (relative to that of wages) in the costly entry model. In turn, this drop also
dampens the negative response of labor’s share to an increase in productivity.




























of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003 (dashed-dotted lines) and costly entry model (circled line).
The evolution of interest rates helps explain the more muted response of output in
the costly entry model. However, this factor is only part of the story when it comes to
explaining the different dynamics of labor’s share in the two models. The existence of
entry costs may, depending on parameter values, make the response of employment
(and wages) persist over time. This persistence is due to resources in the start-up sector
competing with those in the goods-producing sector. As a result, entrants may ﬁnd it
19optimal to delay their entrance so more capital can be used for producing goods when
productivity is high. This delayed response raises wages and employment for several
quarters, increasing the numerator in the expression for labor’s share, explaining the
lagging behavior, that is, the high positive correlation between output and the value of
labor’s share four quarters later.






























Figure 5: Correlations between Real Gross Domestic Product and (led and lagged) Labor’s
Share of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003 (dashed-dotted lines), costly entry model (circled line)
and free entry model (squared line).
So far, we have seen that the joint dynamics of ﬁrm entry, the asset value of a va-
cant position, and the interest rates are important for understanding the dynamics of
income shares. In truth, distinguishing between the dynamics of the value of a vacancy
and interest rates in the costly entry models is unnecessary. Recall that the value of a
vacancy Qt is equal to rtKE
t . In both costly entry models, KE
t displays exactly the same
dynamics, again because yE is a constant and Zt is exogenous. So the behavior of Q is
essentiallydriven bythe behavior of interest rates, r. But letusreturn to understanding
the dynamics of income shares by showing through a different channel that it is indeed
the joint dynamics of entry and real interest rates that are crucial. They are crucial both
for the weak low contemporaneous correlation between output and the labor’s share
and the lagging pattern of the cross-correlations.
20This different channel is running an experiment that involves making ﬁrm entry
less attractive by lowering the efﬁciency of the matching technology. This efﬁciency
is represented by ξ, which we set now to a value of 0.38. (It was 1.551 before). The
result is two effects on ﬁrm entry. First, it lowers the steady-state value of entrants. As
matching becomes more difﬁcult, the probability of matching to a worker decreases.
Thisdecrease lowers the prospects of makingany proﬁts, leadingto a lower level ofen-
trants in equilibrium. Second, ﬁrm entry is less persistent. To understand this second
effect, assume ﬁrst a positive shock to productivity from the steady state. If matching
efﬁciency is low, ﬁrms need to enter relatively early to be able to match with workers
and still take advantage of the higher productivity. Consequently, ﬁrm entry concen-
trates in the ﬁrst fewperiods afterthe shock. The earlyconcentration of entrants results
in a relatively high demand for capital in the “start-up” sector, which prevents inter-
est rates from falling. As a result, the response of output is closer to that of the free
entry model, response that implies a larger drop in labor’s share. Because entry is not
delayed, neither is the response of wages and employment as persistent. Therefore,
the numerator of labor’s share fails to rise much in subsequent periods, reducing the
correlation between output and labor’s share after four quarters. Figure 7 shows the
disappearance of the lagging behavior and the appearance of a strong countercyclical-
ity of labor’s share. That ﬁgure shows that the contemporaneous correlation between
the labor’s share and output is close to -1. Proﬁts shares also display similar dynam-
ics to the free entry model (see Figure 8). To re-iterate, these differences arise because
of changing dynamics in ﬁrm entry, interest rates, and he asset value of a vacant po-
sition. They do not arise because of differences in the level of sunk costs yE, which
has remained at the value calibrated in the previous section throughout the exercise of
lowering ξ.
The previous ﬁgures, and the intuition behind them, make it clear that the behavior
ofentrants, thebehaviorofthevalueofavacancy, andthedynamicsofinterest ratesare
important for understanding the dynamics of income shares. To further validate our































of Real GDP - US Data 1951-2003 (dashed-dotted lines), costly entry model (circled line) and
free entry model (squared line).



























Figure 7: Correlations between Real Gross Domestic Product (output) and (led and lagged)
Labor’s Share of output - costly entry model (circled line) and Low ξ model (squared line).
model we need more evidence. To that end, we show that the dynamics of real interest
rates in the data are consistent with the costly entry model at the expense of the other
two. To get an empirical counterpart to interest rates in the theoretical models, we ﬁrst
obtain quarterly measures of nominal yields from corporate bonds (Baa-rated). We re-
strict the sample as the same as that used to compute correlations of income shares:
1951:Q1-2003:Q1. To transform those nominal yields into real yields, we subtract the


























Figure 8: Correlations between Real Gross Domestic Product (output) and (led and lagged)
Proﬁts’ Share of output - costly entry model (circled line) and Low ξ model (squared line).
inﬂation rate for that quarter (annualized, because yields are annualized as well).13
The ﬁrst row of Table 3.1 shows the correlation at the quarterly frequency of real inter-
est rates and output in the data and in the three model economies.14 The correlation
between the real interest rate and output in the data is -0.348.15 Both the free entry
model and the costly entry model with low ξ feature pro-cyclical interest rates with
correlations close to 1 (0.972 and 0.982 respectively). On the other hand, the Costly En-
try model features countercyclical interest rates. The correlation of these with output
has a value of -0.272, remarkably close to that observed in the data.16
Given the correlations of interest rates and output in the two costly entry models, it
is not surprising that the correlation between the value of a vacancy is negative in the
costly entry model and positive in the costly entry model with low ξ. Given the tight
link in the model between Qt and rt, even though we lack empirical measures of the
13We take current inﬂation as a reasonable forecast of inﬂation in the next three months. In the short-
run, this “random-walk” forecast works remarkably well (see Stock and Watson (1999b)).
14We de-trend real interest rates, both in the data and in the model economies, by computing the
percentage deviation relative to steady state.
15Stock and Watson (1999a), using expected inﬂation from a VAR and the yield on T-bills, report a
correlation of -0.35.
16Gomme, Ravikumar, and Rupert (2010) ﬁnd a weaker, but negative nevertheless (-0.13), correlation
between output and after-tax returns in the SP500 stock market index.
23Table 3.1: Correlations between yt and rt, Qt and NE
t : Data vs. Models
US Data Costly Entry Costly Entry (low ξ) Free Entry
Corr(y,r) -0.348 -0.272 0.982 0.972
Corr(y,Q) N/A -0.664 0.795 N/A
Corr(y, NE) 0.510 0.983 0.992 N/A
valueof a vacancy, the model shows that the real interest rate isan excellentproxy. This
proxy strengthens the hypothesis that the costly entry model is a good representation
of the data.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no good measures of ﬁrm entry exist. Wehave
taken one used by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005), in which they report a correlation
of 0.510 with output (see their Figure 2). However, even if good measures of entry
existed, this variable does not allow one to distinguish among the two costly entry
models. The reason is that ﬁrm entry is procyclical and similar in magnitude in both
models.
We now provide more evidence supporting the costly entry environment. We do
so by looking at yet another feature of the data that existing models have difﬁculty
replicating. Ríos-Rull and Choi (2008), building on the empirical analysis of Ríos-Rull
and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2008), note that an empirical regularity of labor’s share is at
odds with US data in a large class of models. This regularity pertains to the response
of labor’s share to a productivity shock. To replicate their results, we construct a se-
ries for the Solow residual, and we use our measure of labor’s share described above
to follow the same methodology for computing that response. Consequently, we ﬁt a
bivariate VAR to these two series and identify a ”fundamental” innovation to the tech-
nology process, assuming that labor’s share fails to affect technology contemporane-
ously. Speciﬁcally we assume that the “structural” representation of the reduced-form
VAR takes the following form,
lsht = α0 + β0zt + α11lsht−1 + α12zt−1 + ǫlsh,t
24zt = α1 + α21lsht−1 + α22zt−1 + ǫz,t.
Figure 9 shows the response oflabor’s share to a one-standard deviation innovation
in the technology process. Labor’s share falls contemporaneously and starts rising one
quarter after the shock. The rise continues for about ﬁve years, after which labor’s
share slowly returns to its steady-state level.






















Empirical Impulse Response of Labor‘s Share to a 1 s.d. Tech. Shock
Figure 9: Response of labor’s share to a one standard deviation (orthogonalized) innovation to
technology.
Inadditionto the“over-shooting” property, thetwo mostnoticeable featuresarethe
magnitude of the rise (signiﬁcantly above the steady-state level) and the persistence of
the response. In their quest for models that can match this feature of the data, Ríos-
Rull and Choi (2008) focus on a family of search and matching models of the labor
market in which wages are the result of Nash bargaining. The standard model (i.e.
Pissarides (1985) or Shimer (2005)) matches only the initial drop. After the ﬁrst period,
the response of labor’s share is rather muted when compared to the data. It never rises
much above its steady-state level and it displays virtually no persistence. This pattern
remains true even when the model is calibrated to match the volatility of the vacancies-
to-unemployment ratio observed in the data. As our framework belongs to the same
25family of search and matching models, we perform a similar analysis.



























Figure 10: Response of labor’s share to a one standard deviation (orthogonalized) innovation
to technology in our three model economies.
Figure 10 displays the response of labor’s share in the same three models discussed
above: the costly-entry model, the free entry model, and the costly-entry with low
matching efﬁciency. We compute the quarterly response as the three-month average
of the original monthly response. The ﬁrst model, labeled “model”, is the costly-entry
model parameterized according to Section 2.3. The second, labeled “model: low ξ, is the
costly-entry model with a lower matching efﬁciency obtained through a lower value
for ξ. Finally, the third model is the free entry model described brieﬂy above and
in more detail in the appendix. The costly entry model features a labor’s share that
initially falls, rising signiﬁcantly above its steady-state value until its peak ﬁve years
after the impulse. It also persists at above-steady-state levels for a long period of time.
The intuition behind these results follows from the general discussion of the cyclical
dynamics of income shares. The sunk costs of entry introduce sluggishness in the
decision of ﬁrms, generating persistence and helping to achieve the longer duration
in response to a shock. Labor’s share rises because output in the setup-sector falls
initially, relative to its long-run value. Consistent with the plots shown for correlations
26of labor’s share and output, the responses in the free entry model and the costly entry
model with low matching efﬁciency are close and do not match the data well.
3.2 Other Business Cycle Dynamics
After explaining the mechanism by which the costly entry model generates dynamics
of income shares that roughly match those of US data, we now show that improvement
does not come at the expense of many other business cycle dynamics. Of course, there
are dimensions along which the costly entry models under-performs the free entry
model and we also describe those. Table 3.2 shows statistics for our sample of U.S. data
for selected quantities. We focus on consumption (C), investment (I), unemployment
(U), vacancies (V), the vacancies-to-unemployment ratio (V/U), GDP (Y), and total
factorproductivity (Z). Regardinglabormarketvariables, thetwomost salientfeatures
are: high volatility of unemployment, vacancies, and the vacancies-to-unemployment
ratio; and the strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies. The
ﬁrst of the two has been the object of a large literature spawned by Shimer’s (2005)
study, who showed a large discrepancy between the data and traditional models of
search and matching in labor markets, for example Pissarides (1985). Subsequently,
work by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2009) has shown that an appropriate calibration of
the model yields a volatility between the vacancies-to-unemployment ratio and output
close to that observed in the data. However, their calibration is still subject to criticism
based on the large magnitude of the response of unemployment to minor changes in
the level of unemployment beneﬁts (see Hornstein et al. (2005) ). Other important
facts about labor markets are the weak correlation between vacancies and productivity,
the positive correlation between vacancies and output, and the negative correlation
between unemployment and output. Other well-known business cycle facts are the
lower volatility of consumption and the higher volatility of investment, relative to that
of output. Both are highly procyclical.
27Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1951:1 to 2003:4
C I Y Z V U V/U
Std. Dev 0.526 2.984 1.00 0.590 8.635 7.778 16.073
(rel. to output)
Autocorr. 0.851 0.888 0.838 0.742 0.904 0.869 0.895
C 1.000 0.692 0.780 0.195 0.728 -0.649 0.705
I 1.000 0.865 0.360 0.832 -0.727 0.799
Y 1.000 0.541 0.900 -0.837 0.888
Corr. Matrix Z 1.000 0.309 -0.152 0.239
V 1.000 -0.918 0.981
U 1.000 -0.977
V/U 1.000
Table 3.3 displays the models’ standard deviations for some selected variables for
three theoretical economies. The ﬁrst two, labeled the costly entry and the free entry
models, are the same economies as those described in previous sections. The third
economy is a free entry model calibrated along the lines of Shimer (2005). More specif-
ically, this model has a lower value of unemployment, relative to being employed, and
a higher bargaining power for workers.17 Compared to the other two models, the free
entry model (middle column) matches the data quite well. The degree of ampliﬁcation
is large, and as a result, standard deviations are close to those observed in the data.
Nevertheless, in the costly entry model the increases in the standard deviation, relative
to the free entry model, are not trivial. Vacancies, unemployment, and the vacancies-
to-unemployment ratio all display volatilities that are almost three times those shown
by the free entry model with the standard calibration.18
Tounderstand the mechanism ofampliﬁcation in the costly entry model, a standard
version ofthe Pissarides(1985)modelisuseful. For concreteness, let’stake the problem
solved by Shimer (2005), which abstracts from capital, ﬁrm entry, but features contin-
uous time. Firms and workers search for jobs, and the output of a worker if matched
17In the appendix we describe the calibration of both free entry economies.
18Most results in this paper do not work if we specify a time-varying vacancy posting cost ω. That
speciﬁcation is not equivalent to the costly entry model. However, the time-varying posting cost, if it is
countercyclical, causes the volatility of labor market variables to increase, but the persistent dynamics
that characterize the costly entry model are absent. Those dynamics improve the behavior of income
shares, and that behavior is our main object of study.
28Table 3.3: Standard Deviations
Cost. Entry Free Entry Free Entry (low b/w
and high φ)
U 2.872 6.736 1.245
V 1.636 5.988 0.742
V/U 4.659 15.847 1.683
C 1.223 0.219 0.220
I 4.570 4.413 4.739
Y 1.000 1.000 1.000
with a ﬁrm is Z, an exogenous value for productivity that follows a given stochas-
tic process. When workers are looking for a job, they receive unemployment beneﬁts b
and the matching mechanism is identical to that of the costly entry model. The dynam-
ics of this economy are represented by the following four equations (where r denotes
the discount rate instead of the interest rate and θ the vacancies-to-unemployment ra-
tio):
rQ = −ω + q(θ)(J − Q),
rJ = Z − w − s(J − Q),
rWu = b + f (θ)(We − Wu),
rWe = w − s(We −Wu).
The notation of the value functions follows the costly entry model: J is the value of
a ﬁlled job, Q is the value of a vacancy, We is the value of being employed, and Wu is
the value of being unemployed. To understand the high volatility of labor market vari-
ables, it is illustrative to calculate the elasticity of θ (the vacancies-to-unemployment
ratio) to changes in the net labor productivity Z − b. Assuming free entry yields Q = 0
29in equilibrium, and the elasticity under that case is given by:19
εθ|Z−b =
r + s + φf (θ)
(r + s)(1− η (θ)) + φf (θ)
where η (θ) ∈ [0,1] is the elasticity of f (θ) with respect to θ. How does this elasticity
change if we assume Q > 0 and if Q is cyclical and varies with Z? One can show that
its value is given by the relatively more complicated expression:
εθ|Z−b =
(r + s + φf (θ))Ψ + (1− φ)rq(θ) QΨ
(r + s)(1− η (θ)) + φf (θ)
where Ψ = 1 − (Z − b + ω)rQ′ (Z)/(ω + rQ). If Q′(Z) < 0, that is, if Q is coun-
tercyclical or responds negatively to changes in Z, then Ψ > 1. Therefore, the elasticity
with Q > 0 is larger than when Q = 0.
Readers may think about our costly entry model as one in which Q(Z) is an en-
dogenous and complicated object. Its cyclical dynamics are jointly determined with
the volume of entrants in the market and the behavior of interest rates. We do not dis-
play standard deviations from the costly entry model with low matching efﬁciency ξ,
butthe volatility oflabormarketvariablesin thatmodelissmallerthanin the freeentry
model, even the one calibrated with a high b/w. Interest rates are procyclical, making
Q procyclical as well. Risking being repetitive, the value of a vacancy Q is counter-
cyclical in the costly entry model because interest rates are countercyclical. Therefore,
the mechanism that ampliﬁes the volatility of labor market variables is tightly linked
to the mechanism that improves the dynamics of income shares.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 display correlations between selected variables in the costly en-
try and the free entry models. Consumption and investment are procyclical in both
19The equilibrium condition that pins down the value of θ is given by:
r + s
q(θ)
+ φθ = (1 − φ)
Z − b − rQ
ω + rQ
.
From this expression, once we have set Q = 0, it is easy to ﬁnd the derivative of θ with respect to Z − b.
30Table 3.4: Cross Correlations: Costly Entry Model
C I V/U U V Y Z
C 1.000 0.846 0.686 -0.878 0.627 0.891 0.823
I 1.000 -0.167 0.345 0.146 0.983 0.945
V/U 1.000 -0.882 0.907 -0.005 0.138
U 1.000 -0.838 0.185 0.039
V 1.000 0.317 0.455
Y 1.000 0.990
Z 1.000
Table 3.5: Cross Correlations: Free Entry Model
C I V/U U V Y Z
C 1.000 0.949 0.814 -0.735 0.760 0.979 0.856
I 1.000 0.791 -0.889 0.795 0.993 0.982
V/U 1.000 -0.623 0.710 0.785 0.775
U 1.000 -0.511 -0.899 -0.843
V 1.000 0.810 0.876
Y 1.000 0.987
Z 1.000
models, with correlations well above 0.70. The correlation between vacancies and
productivity is weaker and closer to the data (0.309) in the costly entry model (0.455)
then in the free entry model (0.876). However, we pay a price for this weaker corre-
lation between vacancies and productivity in the form of an acyclical unemployment
rate, the biggest drawback of our model. The reason for the acyclical unemployment
rate is that vacancies are a predetermined variable, and as a result, the vacancies-to-
unemployment ratio is not very cyclical. Therefore employment is not very cyclical.
However, the costly entry model shows a stronger correlation between vacancies and
unemployment (the slope of the Beveridge curve) than the model with free entry. The
reason is that in the costly entry model, vacancies do not react immediately to changes
in productivity: existing ﬁrms that separate from their workers do no repost vacan-
cies; entrants need to wait for one period and pay yE before posting them. As a result,
vacancies and unemployment move closer to one-to-one than in the free entry envi-
31ronment, where vacancies immediately adjust to changes in productivity but unem-
ployment does not. Finally, costly entry has an effect on the persistence of shocks over
time. Table 3.6 displays the ﬁrst four autocorrelations for the same variables as those in
Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Even though investment is less persistent in the costly entry model,
labor market variables, in particular vacancies and the vacancies-to-unemployment
ratio, become more correlated over time.20 In particular, regarding the persistence of
vacancy creation, these results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Fujita and Ramey (2007).
Table 3.6: Autocorrelations
1 2 3 4
Costly Entry 0.805 0.557 0.348 0.175
C Free Entry 0.813 0.575 0.370 0.200
Costly Entry 0.738 0.446 0.223 0.053
I Free Entry 0.880 0.686 0.480 0.283
Costly Entry 0.958 0.852 0.707 0.539
V/U Free Entry 0.728 0.416 0.178 0.004
Costly Entry 0.960 0.856 0.709 0.539
U Free Entry 0.943 0.802 0.615 0.414
Costly Entry 0.923 0.777 0.611 0.439
V Free Entry 0.715 0.392 0.153 -0.017
Costly Entry 0.759 0.474 0.249 0.076
Y Free Entry 0.845 0.625 0.415 0.226
4 Final Remarks
We have constructed a quantitative model of the macroeconomy that is consistent with
most income shares’ time series facts. The novel aspect of our environment relative to
models with frictional labor markets is to assume costly entry by ﬁrms. This assump-
tion introduces cyclical dynamics in the asset value of a vacant position, a value which
in equilibrium has to equal the expenditures undertaken by ﬁrms to enter production
markets. For the model to account for income shares’ dynamics and to propagate and
20Of course, the autocorrelation of shocks is the same across the two models.
32amplify productivity shocks, the asset value of a vacancy has to be negatively corre-
lated with output over the business cycle. In our framework, interest rates have to be
negatively correlated. This negative correlation of real interest rates and output has
proven difﬁcult to obtain in production economies.
Although the framework can account for many time series facts regarding labor
markets and income shares times, work remains to be done. For instance, labor’s share
seems to have a high volatility at lowfrequencies but a low volatility at high frequen-
cies. This translates to a large and persistent response of that share to changes in pro-
ductivity. The cyclical component of labor’s share is smoother than output. These two
facts are difﬁcult to reconcile with the type of model we have presented and call for
further research to account for low-frequency movements in income shares of a dif-
ferent nature than the high frequency movements observed between expansions and
recessions.
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36A Appendix: The Free-Entry Model
For the sake of exposition we brieﬂy describe the free entry model (Pissarides (1985)
and Shimer (2005)). This model serves as a benchmark framework for many of the
results in the text.
The economy is populated by a large household of measure one. Members of the
household can be either employed or unemployed. Denote the fraction of those em-











A general good Y is produced using capital K and labor N by a single ﬁrm employ-
ing the following technology,
Y = ZKαN1−α, (23)
Z represents technology (TFP) that evolves according to:
log(Zt) = ρlog(Zt−1) + ǫt. (24)
The innovation ǫt is i.i.d. The labor market is characterized by search and matching
frictions. Unemployed workers search, and ﬁrms post vacancies. It costs ω to post one
vacancy, and workers and ﬁrms match according to the following matching technol-
ogy,
M(1 − N,V) =
(1 − N)V




The household owns shares in the ﬁrm obtaining proﬁts equal to πt. As a result, the
ﬁrm discounts the future (between any period t and t + 1) using the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution of the household: β(
Ct+1
Ct )−σ. The equilibrium value of a
vacancy is zero, as ﬁrms will enter until there are no gains made by posting them. We
denote by q the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁlls a vacancy, by s the rate at which existing







Jt = πt + β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σJt+1(1 − s). (27)
We assume wages are negotiated through Nash bargaining, in which ﬁrms have a bar-











The interpretation of this expression is analogous to that of the text. As vacancies have
zero value in equilibrium the threat point for the ﬁrm is zero. The threat point for
the representative household, is given by the marginal disutility of having one more
member unemployed. Finally, the aggregate resource constraint equates total goods
produced, net of vacancy creation costs, to the sum of investment and consumption:
Yt − ωVt = Ct + It. (29)
Table A.1 summarizes our parameterization of the free entry model. We keep the
targets for the calibration the same as in the costly entry model to ease comparisons.
The only exception to this approach is the target for the ratio of unemployment bene-
ﬁts to wages. This ratio is set to 0.426 in the costly entry model and to 0.95 in the free
entry model. In the spirit of the parameterization used by Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2010) we also decrease the bargaining weight φ to a value of 0.1. Both of these features
are responsible for the large ampliﬁcation mechanism. Table A.2 displays the parame-
terization of the model labeled “free entry with low b/w and high φ”. This alternative
parameterization is the result of setting φ to 0.5 and calibrating b/w to be 0.426. It is
roughly consistent with the one used by Shimer (2005).















Table A.2: Summary of Parameterization (Free Entry with low b/w and high φ)
Parameter Value
σ 1.500
φ 0.5
ρz 0.964
σz 0.005
s 0.019
β (0.99)
1
3
δ 0.005
b 1.353
ω 3.112
ξ 2.375
α 0.30
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